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Whose Community? Market Economics  
and the Concept of Solidarity
Paul R. Koch
Olivet Nazarene University
Abstract: The debate over the relationship between market processes and 
community values has intensified in recent years, due to the pace of eco-
nomic change, as well as the respective impacts of the global financial 
crisis and the pandemic. This essay explores various conceptions of com-
munity, raising the question of whether or not a genuine sense of social 
solidarity requires that those who participate in those interactions live 
in physical proximity to one another. The implications of this discussion 
for economic policy are also examined, including the possibility that the 
composition of what has been historically regarded as “conservative” eco-
nomics might be altered in a way that would be designed to benefit com-
munities that are defined in local or national terms. Given the negative 
economic consequences of those actions that might be characterized as 
“building walls,” attention is devoted to potential policies that are intended 
to “build bridges” to the future for those who have been dislocated by new 
patterns of market activity. These explorations seek to advance the goal 
of assisting certain definitions of community without assuming that they 
have a higher moral standing than other conceptions of social solidarity, 
while also avoiding the conclusion that existing jobs and industries are 
more important than those which have not yet come into existence.
In 1982, the late Michael Novak, who was a resident scholar in philos-ophy, religion, and public policy at the American Enterprise Institute at the time, published The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism.1 One of 
the major components of this book was the presentation of a framework 
that became known as the “Novak triangle.” In this paradigm, Novak 
argued that the economic system, which he described as “democratic 
capitalism,” was really three systems in one:
1. an economic system based on voluntary trade and exchange of 
goods and services between willing parties;
2. a political system based on some form of democracy, in which 
the people elect their leaders and the government is constrained 
by the rule of law; and
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3. a moral and cultural system that consists of voluntary associa-
tions, such as religious organizations and educational institu-
tions, that occupy the space between the state at one end of a 
social continuum and families and individuals at the other end.
Both the political and moral-cultural systems impose different con-
straints on the economic system. The political system determines the 
institutions and policies that will govern the market process — “the 
rules of the game,” if you will. The moral and cultural system imparts 
the values and virtues that people take into the marketplace, as workers, 
owners, managers, and investors. Within this framework, concepts of 
community and solidarity dwell in the latter system as manifestations of 
the various forms of voluntary association. 
Novak resisted the contention that democratic capitalism was inher-
ently hostile to communitarian values. While conceding that a market 
economy might alter traditional forms of social connection, he also main-
tained that it lends itself to the establishment of new forms of community:
It is a community of colleagueship, task-oriented, goal-directed, 
freely entered into and freely left. Its members have much respect 
for each other, learn much from each other, come to expect truth 
from each other, and treat one another fairly. Still, they may not 
have much emotional attachment to each other, spend much 
time looking into each other’s eyes for moral support, or be par-
ticularly intimate with one another. They may enjoy comrade-
ship in fighting the same battles, in enduring together the slings 
of hostile fortune, and in taking up each other’s necessities.2
To some who argue that market forces harm traditional manifestations 
of community and social solidarity, Novak’s counterexample is some-
what less than relevant, because their implicit assumption is that local 
and long-standing connections are inherently preferable to those that 
might be newer and more geographically distant in nature. 
In recent years, David Goodhart has provided an example of this 
position, particularly in the context of the Brexit debate in the United 
Kingdom. Goodhart draws a distinction between two different social 
groups, which he categorizes as “anywheres” and “somewheres.” He 
describes the former category as consisting of persons who “have por-
table ‘achieved’ identities, based on educational and career success 
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which makes them generally comfortable and confident with new places 
and people.”3 By contrast, the latter group is comprised of those who 
“are more rooted and usually have ‘ascribed’ identities . . . based on 
group belonging and particular places, which is why they often find rapid 
change more unsettling.”4 
The use of the word “rooted” provides a hint of Goodhart’s view 
of which category possesses a more authentic sense of community, as 
well as his statement that somewheres are “more communitarian by 
instinct.”5 By contrast, Brian Griffiths, who has described Goodhart’s 
book as “the most perceptive analysis of the difference between those 
who voted ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’” in the 2016 Brexit referendum, also 
cites his work in concluding that anywheres “place less emphasis on tra-
dition, family, faith, and nation.”6
The Brexit referendum is an imperfect representation of the poten-
tial trade-off between market processes and conceptions of community, 
because some critics of the European Union, both inside and outside 
the United Kingdom, focus on centralized means, such as regulation. 
At the same time, other euroskeptics concentrate on liberalized ends, 
with the single market serving as a prime example. However, it does 
provide a fascinating case study of the interaction between economic, 
political, and cultural factors7 and offers a potential point of entry for a 
discussion of alternative perspectives on the idea of solidarity between 
persons and the vision of a humane economy. 
Does a genuine sense of community require that those who partic-
ipate in those interactions live in physical proximity to one another? 
Can the “community of colleagueship,” of which Novak wrote, generate 
the same level of solidarity as one that is based on membership of the 
same family or nation? John Schneider has addressed these questions by 
maintaining that moral proximity, in the Christian community, does not 
have to necessarily coincide with geography or biological relationships 
and that one’s vocation may very well play a significant role in these 
matters:
Moral proximity will often mean different things to different 
Christians. The general principle is the same, but it will mean 
one thing to an unmarried teacher, another to a banker with a 
large family, and quite another to a professional politician, stay-
at-home mother, truck driver, garbage collector, or lonely artist. 
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Moreover, we may each of us have very special senses of prox-
imity that make little or no sense to anyone else.8
What are the potential implications of these alternative visions of com-
munity for the design and implementation of economic policy? For 
decades, American “conservatives” have mostly identified with the per-
spective known in political economy as “orthodox economic liberalism.” 
This school of thought believes that both individual liberty and economic 
prosperity are enhanced by a limited degree of government interven-
tion and regulation.9 This perspective also places a high value, relative to 
other objectives, on economic efficiency, technological innovation, and 
international economic integration.10 To borrow Joseph Schumpeter’s 
famous metaphor for the driving force in a market economy, orthodox 
economic liberals emphasize the creative side of the “gale of creative 
destruction.” This helps explain the historic preference of “conserva-
tives” for a policy menu that favors relatively low tax rates (especially at 
the margin), fewer regulations, and open trade between nations. 
Orthodox economic liberals have also argued that the best way to 
assist those who encounter the “destructive” side of a dynamic market 
economy is to foster an environment of growth and opportunity, which 
will enable those who have experienced a loss in business or employ-
ment to adjust to new possibilities at a lower transitional cost. This par-
ticular manifestation of “conservative” thought has maintained that 
public policies that are designed to protect existing firms and jobs from 
these kinds of change will be counterproductive in the long run. In the 
words of Mike Moore, the former director general of the World Trade 
Organization: 
It is hard to argue the merits of Joseph Schumpeter’s princi-
ples of Creative Destruction to unemployed fifty-year-old meat 
workers. But the argument must be made. You can save old jobs 
for a while at the cost of new jobs, but in the end you finish up 
with neither the old jobs nor the new ones.11
More recently, the cultural component of American “conservatism,” as 
opposed to the economic dimension, has experienced an increase in 
both visibility and significance. An important element of this develop-
ment has been a renewed emphasis on the impact of the “destructive” 
side of market dynamics, especially with their international dimensions, 
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on preexisting forms of community. An ironic aspect of this trend is the 
extent to which these arguments have, to some extent, mirrored those 
positions that “structuralist” critics of the entire democratic capitalist 
system have offered.12 While cultural conservatives affirm free enter-
prise, they express clear preferences for local and national commerce (as 
opposed to global trade), manufacturing and agriculture (as opposed to 
the financial sector and some service and information-oriented segments 
of the economy), and small to medium-sized enterprises (as opposed to 
large corporations). 
Aside from a consideration of costs and benefits, would a policy mix 
that altered the orthodox economic liberal approach in a way that would 
be intended to address these concerns, also foster a greater degree of 
community? And what kind of solidarity is most likely to be encour-
aged? One political tradition that has wrestled with these questions 
since World War II has been the Christian Democratic Movement across 
the European continent. Norbert Neuhaus and Horst Langes have 
maintained that this perspective provides a sharp contrast to both the 
individualist and collectivist understanding of this term. In their view: 
“Solidarity is a fundamental social principle that springs from the social 
nature of man. This solidarity likewise embraces all other peoples and 
nations in a globalised world.”13 (Emphasis added.)
Neuhaus and Langes also stress that “every individual is simultane-
ously a member of a number of different communities” and that “each 
of these communities expects a corresponding degree of solidarity and 
contributions, which might however in practice overlap or even mutu-
ally exclude one another.”14 This discussion implies that, similar to 
Schneider’s idea of moral proximity, social obligations and communal 
responsibilities do not have to be limited to those that are a function of 
geographical location. 
However, a significant number of the initiatives that have been 
advocated to benefit particular communities, such as trade restrictions or 
industrial policies, are rooted in identities that are largely local, regional, 
or national in nature. Given the negative economic consequences often 
associated with these initiatives, there is an ongoing search for alterna-
tive policies that offer the potential for simultaneous enhancement of 
both markets and communities, without making the judgments, either 
implicitly or explicitly, that (1) local and national production have a 
higher moral standing than production located elsewhere does, and (2) 
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existing jobs and sectors have a higher moral standing than future jobs 
and industries do, including those that might not yet exist.
Glenn Hubbard has provided some potential options that, while 
intended to assist those who have been hurt by the disruptions associ-
ated with changes in the patterns of trade or technological innovation, 
may offer “positive externalities” in the spheres of community and 
social solidarity. Using the metaphor of a “wall,” he argues that trade 
protectionism and increased market regulation, while responding “to a 
broadly shared desire for security and stability,” are costly and “unlikely 
to hold over time,” as Mike Moore has asserted.15 At the same time, 
Hubbard maintains that defenders of a liberal approach to international 
economics have implicitly assumed that the advantages of global mar-
kets “are easily available to everyone and that what is lost in the process 
was of no value.”16 Employing the metaphor of a “bridge,” he offers the 
following statement as an alternative approach:
Missing in the debate between these two sets of arguments is 
another way of dealing with change — not by ignoring its char-
acter or imagining that it can be permanently held off, but by 
adapting to it with strategies that take the costs involved seri-
ously. If walls cannot protect those harmed by the transforma-
tion of the modern economy, bridges can connect them to its 
benefits and help make otherwise impossible transitions.17
Hubbard proceeds to offer two different categories of potential “bridge-
building” policies, which he groups under the headings preparation and 
reconnection. The former “requires support for skill acquisition and 
enhancement of individuals’ working lives,”18 while the latter “focuses 
on individuals whose employment prospects and earnings have been 
significantly diminished or left behind.”19 In the first category, Hubbard 
refers to an increase in the level of public funding for both community 
colleges and university-level research, as well as tax credits that will 
encourage businesses to invest in the “human capital” — skills, talents, 
abilities, and knowledge — of their existing employees.20 
In the second group, Hubbard offers various options for expanding 
or revising the public commitment to the provision of social insurance. 
These proposals include the expansion of both the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program and the earned income tax credit, the establishment 
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of new initiatives in health insurance reform, a form of wage insurance 
that would be primarily intended for older workers, and assistance to the 
long-term unemployed, particularly in areas with a significant number of 
persons in this category.21 
The last idea represents an example of what Timothy Bartik has 
described as a “place-based jobs policy.” Citing Adam Smith’s 18th- 
century observation that many people are not inclined to be geograph-
ically mobile and recent data from the United States that supports 
this conclusion, Bartik concludes: “These staying percentages reflect 
enhanced life satisfaction that people gain from the familiar people and 
places of their home area.”22 In our own time, this preference is likely to 
be reinforced by the difference in housing costs between various regions 
of the nation and the costs of moving. Bartik writes: “estimates of the 
moving subsidy required for the median person to be indifferent to their 
current location and an otherwise similar location often exceed 100 per-
cent of annual income,” with this projection increasing if other family 
members live in close proximity to the person’s current location.23 These 
factors may contribute to the existence of involuntary unemployment in 
certain communities, and Bartik argues for policies that are designed to 
address these situations:
Involuntary unemployment makes it likely that benefits from 
jobs are higher in distressed places. The social benefits from a 
higher employment rate include both the private benefits to 
individuals who otherwise would not be employed, and external 
benefits like lower crime, benefits for family members, and local 
fiscal benefits.24
Debates over the relative merits of these policies and related alterna-
tives are likely to continue for some time, especially if the current decade 
conforms to the prediction, by Deutsche Bank Research, as the “Age of 
Disorder.”25 
These discussions will likely be influenced by different answers to the 
question that the “expert in the law” asked Jesus in the Gospel of Luke: 
“And who is my neighbor?”26 Nigel Biggar has concluded that given 
“our limited emotional, physical, temporal, and material resources,” a 
case can be made for extending a relative degree of priority to the cit-
izens of one’s own community or nation; in his words: “The argument 
from God’s agape to Christian cosmopolitanism does not work.”27 
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A somewhat different perspective is presented by Paul Rowe, who 
has observed that the call to serve “all nations” is associated with — to 
borrow language from the third chapter of the Apostle Paul’s Letter to 
the Galatians  —  “no longer identifying with national titles such as Jews 
and Greeks.”28 At the same time, in the context of evangelical Protestant 
Christianity and drawing on several international examples, Rowe 
argues that “patriotic and globalist forms of evangelical action are not 
exclusive perspectives.”29 
This final thought provides a measure of hope in the ongoing search 
for policies and institutions that will facilitate the search for a humane 
economy that includes healthy communities — not only domestically 
but also internationally. In the same way in which economists believe 
trade and exchange are mutually beneficial, efforts to strengthen social 
connections at the local or national level do not have to be pursued 
in a manner that comes at the expense of a global sense of solidarity. 
“Bridge-building” policies offer the potential for providing transitional 
support for our fellow citizens who have borne the concentrated costs 
of economic adjustment, while avoiding the counterproductive conse-
quences of “wall-building” policies that also shift some of the burden 
of those costs to community members who happen to live in other 
nations.
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